Papers
Auctions in Electronic Commerce
Book Chapter in: The Handbook of Technology Management, John Wiley and Sons, To appear in 2009.
LikeOptimal Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders
The 11th IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing, IEEE CEC, 2009. (Accepeted)
The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions islimited to handling the case of single units of multiple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly one bundle (single minded bidders). This paper extends the current art by proposing an optimal auction for procuring multiple units of multiple items when the bidders are single minded. We develop a procurement auction that minimizes the cost ofprocurement while satisfying Bayesian incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality. Under appropriate regularity conditions, this optimal auction also satisfies dominant strategy incentive compatibility. The results presented here hold true for equivalent forward auction settings as well.
Redistribution of VCG Payments in Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects
In Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics(WINE), 2008, pp 438-445.
Foundations of mechanism design: A tutorial Part 1 – Key concepts and classical results
Sadhana - Indian Academy Proceedings in Engineering Sciences, Volume 33, Part 2, pp 83-130, April 2008.
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Foundations of Mechanism Design: A Tutorial - Part 2: Advanced Concepts and Results.
Sadhana - Indian Academy Proceedings in Engineering Sciences, Volume 33, Part 2, pp 131-174, April 2008.
An Optimal Multi-Unit Combinatorial Procurement Auction with Single Minded Bidders
Managing Complexity in a Distributed World, a Centenary Conference of Division of Electrical Sciences, Indian Institute of Science, (MCDES) 2008.
Measures for Classification and Detection in Steganalysis
In 'Proceedings of the 3rd Workshop on Computer Vision, Graphics and Image Processing - WCVGIP 2006'
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